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Who? Whom? Reparations and the Problem of Agency
Chandran Kukathas
If a person is wronged, whether by a physical violation of his person or by
having his property unjustly taken, or even by the besmirching of his reputation,
he is, most people agree, entitled to some form of compensation or restitution
from the person or persons responsible for the wrong. What form the reparation
should take, and how great it should be, are sometimes difficult problems, but this
does not change the fact that something is owed and someone must be held to
account. If a restaurant goes bust because a supplier fails to fulfill his commit-
ments and a newspaper publishes false reports of the restaurant’s allegedly unethi-
cal practices, the business owner can seek compensation from those responsible
for the harm he has suffered. The fact that apportioning responsibility will not be
easy makes no difference: the law must try to find an answer that rectifies the
injustice. Similarly, it can be argued, the harm suffered by the descendants of
victims of unredressed injustices of the past cries out no less urgently for attention.
Many people today suffer as a consequence of wrongs committed in the past, and
they too, some say, are entitled to some form of restitution. The fact that matters
are complex is no reason for them to give up their claims, or for others to give up
on the task finding answers to the question of who owes what to whom.
It seems fair to say that the complexity of the problem of apportioning
responsibility, and of settling the nature and extent of compensation owed, should
not deter us from trying to do justice. We seek only as much precision as we can
plausibly hope for, and make compromises to ensure that some justice is done,
imperfect justice being better than no justice at all. Yet matters are importantly
different when the problem is not so much determining the form of restitution but
establishing who the relevant parties are in the case. In cases of past injustice, the
problem of identifying the parties often turns out to be especially troublesome.
Indeed, the more remote the original wrong, the more difficult it is to establish
who has cause for complaint and who can rightly be held responsible.
In this paper, I argue that the pursuit of justice by making reparation for past
wrongs, and particularly for wrongs done more than a generation ago, is not
morally justifiable except in some special cases. For the paying of reparations to
be defensible, it must be possible to identify two kinds of agent: the victim of
injustice, to whom reparation is owed, and the perpetrator or beneficiary of
injustice who can be held accountable for the wrong or liable for the cost
of restitution. If both agents cannot be identified, there cannot be a case for
reparation. It may be possible to justify, say, the return of some lands to people
JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 37 No. 3, Fall 2006, 330–341.
© 2006 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Published in Journal of Social Philosophy, 
Volume 37, Issue 3, September 2006, 
Pages 330-341, 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00340.x
who have been dispossessed, if we can identify the dispossessed and also those
who can be held accountable; but it is not possible to justify, say, compensation for
the descendants of slavery generally. Some persons can be held responsible for
some of the wrongs of the past, but one generation cannot be asked to atone for
the sins of earlier ones.
Such a conclusion might be defended for many reasons,1 but in this paper I
focus on the problem of identifying the agents who might make claims, and the
agents against whom claims might be made. One aspect of this topic has already
been explored by a number of authors in the literature on the rectification of past
injustice. This is the issue of whether the descendants of victims of past injustice
can make defensible claims for compensation given that, without the injustice,
they might never have come into existence.2 Because this topic has been examined
in depth, I propose to put it to one side, and to focus on other aspects of the
problem of agency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I considers why it is necessary that
we be able to identify the agents who are the victims of past injustice and those
who are to be held responsible for rectifying them. It is not sufficient merely to
establish that injustices did occur, and that there do exist modern day descendants
of the victims of injustice, and modern day descendants of perpetrators of injus-
tice. Section II argues that it is difficult, if not impossible, accurately to identify
the individual agents who can rightly be held responsible for historical injustices,
or the agents who are owed reparation. Section III takes up the question of whether
responsibility might be understood not as a relationship between individuals but
rather as one between groups. In particular, it considers the question of whether
the state might be understood as a moral agent with responsibility for rectifying
the injustices of the past. It concludes that there is a limit to the extent to which
responsibility can be laid at the door of the state.
I
Many people and communities that are the descendants of victims of injustice
in the past live disadvantaged lives. The descendants of American slaves are on
average worse-off than are the rest of the population of the United States; the
descendants of Australian Aborigines are generally worse-off than the non-
Aboriginal population; and the Maori of New Zealand do less well than their
pakeha counterparts on most measures of well-being, from life expectancy to rates
of incarceration. There are many reasons why a political community might want
to acknowledge the wrongs of the past. For one thing, it seems likely that the
events of the past have had a significant bearing on who fares well and who fares
poorly: the probability of one’s life going well is affected substantially by the
community into which one is born. For another thing, the fact that people are
suffering itself gives us some reason to attend to them, and when that suffering has
a long history, that very history may need to be acknowledged.
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If, however, we wish to do justice to specific individuals or groups, we need to
do more than take note of history’s injustices. We need to identify with some
precision who is a victim of injustice, and who can rightly be held responsible—or
liable. But why do we need to be precise if we know that there has been injustice in
the past and that there are people who are suffering in the present? One reason is that
this is, at least implicitly, what those who see themselves as victims of past injustice
demand. Their claim is not that their condition should be remedied because they
have simply done badly out of history. It is that they should be compensated in some
way because they have been treated unjustly. Their claim is different from that
which might be made by the poor more generally: that the background institutions
under which they have remained poor are unfair or systematically biased in favor of
others or not conducive to equality. Their claim is, rather, that particular wrongs
were committed and that it is the further injustices that were consequent upon them
that need to be rectified. If this is indeed their contention, then their claims can only
be addressed by identifying the agents who deserve restitution and those who are
liable for providing it. For them, it will not do simply to lump them in with the poor
more generally, for their claim is of a very specific nature.
Irrespective of the claims of the descendants of victims of past injustice,
however, it is necessary to identify the agents involved in matters of historical
injustice because justice in restitution generally demands that we know who is
obliged to restore whom. If the issue were one of distributive justice rather than
justice in rectification, there would be no need to do so, since the problem would
be one of determining what background institutions should operate, and what
principles should guide them. Indeed, at least according to some thinkers, estab-
lishing the institutions of distributive justice may even require that the identity of
the agents who might have claims of justice be unknown. For John Rawls, for
example, just institutions are those that would be chosen by parties to an agree-
ment in which no one knew his or her identity. But when the issue is one of justice
in restitution, identifying those who are to be held liable or entitled to compen-
sation is crucial, because the question is not simply one of how the benefits and
burdens should be distributed in a good society, but rather a question of who owes
what to whom even if distributive institutions are just. This means that the
question of justice in restitution is at least a different kind of question to that of
distributive justice, even if it might be held, in the end, to be an aspect of the
problem of distributive justice understood more broadly.3
The next question then is, who are the relevant agents when justice in
rectification is at issue? There are three kinds of agent who can make, or be asked
to fulfill, moral claims: individuals and two kinds of group agents including
collective entities and corporate entities. An individual is an agent insofar as he or
she is an actor who is capable of making decisions and can be held to account—or
held responsible—for those decisions. A group is an agent when it is capable of
making decisions and can be held responsible for them. A group is not an agent
when it is merely a category or class of persons, such as the set of all platinum
blondes; nor is it an agent when it is simply a collection of people, such as a
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crowd, or even a neighborhood, since it lacks any locus of decision making, or any
structure or organization that establishes an authority capable of taking a decision
on its behalf, and that is recognized as such. Group agents include partnerships,
families, clubs, churches, companies, and private and public associations of
various kinds such as charities and universities. They also include governments of
all kinds: local, provincial, and national, as well as international organizations.
Tribes can also be regarded as group agents.
Group agents can be understood either as collective entities or as corporate
entities. A group is a collective entity when the interests of the group are congruent
with the interests of the individuals who comprise it. Partnerships, families, and
clubs, for example, are uncontroversially entities whose interests coincide with the
interests of their members. What is good for the family is good only because it is
good for the individuals who comprise it. There can be no conflict between the
interests of the family and the interests of its members, even if, on occasion, the
interests of some particular members may have to be sacrificed to preserve
the integrity of the entity that serves the interests of all. Many groups are best
understood as collective entities, for their value and purpose are best understood
in terms of the way in which they serve the interests of their members.
Nonetheless, group agents can sometimes also be understood as entities
whose interests are not congruent with the interests of their members. They may
be entities that have a life, and an ethical standing that is independent of the lives
of the individuals that comprise them. A tribe, for example, might be regarded as
having interests over an above those of the interests of individual members to the
extent that its interest is in its own survival as an entity. Individual members might
value it to the extent that it serves their interests in having particular services
provided or in having an association that supplies them with an identity. But they
may find that they can secure these goods by joining other tribes. If the tribe is
understood as a corporate entity, however, it can be regarded as having interests of
its own, regardless of whether its members value it. The protection of this interest
might be justified on the grounds that the continued existence of this entity
preserves values that are not congruent with the particular interests of the
members that comprise the group. In the case of the tribe, it might be that the
continued existence of the corporate entity preserves a culture that its members no
longer value. Defenders of (the interests of) the corporate agent may be outsiders
who benefit from its continued existence.
Many group agents may be viewed under either aspect, as collective or
corporate agents. A company, for example, is a collective of shareholders, and also
a collective of employees. But it may also be a corporate entity with an existence
independent of either employees or shareholders, who cannot be held entirely
liable for its actions. The interests of employees, shareholders, and others affected
by the operations of the corporation—its creditors, for example—can differ
significantly.
States, provinces, and townships may also be understood as either collective
or corporate agents. They are collective agents insofar as their interests are nothing
Reparations and the Problem of Agency 333
more than the interests of their members. They are corporate agents, however, to
the extent that they can be viewed as entities with interests—and liabilities—of
their own, independent of the interests of their members. A state might, for
instance, have an interest in its own survival, even if its members are indifferent
(or even hostile) to its continued existence. A state whose members want to secede
into two states would supply an example of this. The continued existence of the
state as a corporate entity might be valued by non-members, who have, say,
purchased government bonds whose value would disappear if the state vanished,
but not valued by members who have nothing to gain by continuing their
membership.
When the issue of how to redress historical injustice arises, the problem is to
work out who has a claim upon whom for compensation for past wrongs. This
means working out which agents have claims against which other agents for
actions taken in the past that have damaged some and benefited others. Claims
might be made by individuals against other individuals, individuals against
groups, groups against groups, and groups against individuals. The validity of any
claim would depend, among other things, on the proper identification of the agents
in question as persons entitled to make claims or persons liable for fulfilling them.
The issue is: how readily can this be done?
II
The problem of identifying the relevant agents in trying to establish claims
for restitution for past injustice is more difficult than has been recognized. Who is
entitled to compensation for a wrong committed, and who is liable to pay is
sometimes easy enough to ascertain when victim and perpetrator are both alive,
though it can get progressively more difficult to establish the extent of entitlement
and responsibility as time goes on. When generations have passed, even identify-
ing the parties to the case is difficult.
To begin with, let us consider the problem of identifying the claimants, before
turning to the problem of establishing who is liable for providing restitution to
those who are harmed. Some claimants will be individual descendants of the
victims of past injustice. One thing that should be noted at the outset is that it is
not obvious that the descendant of a victim of injustice is owed anything by
anyone. Certainly the law in most countries does not always presume that descen-
dants have such claims. If Nancy in generation one is beaten and killed by Bill
Sykes, her surviving daughter, Nancy Junior, cannot, in generation two, make any
claim against Bill Sykes Junior (who earns his living as a boxer, using the skills his
father, Bill Senior, imparted to him).4 Nancy Junior may have been orphaned, and
now be destitute, and Bill Junior may have become wealthy as a boxer. If Bill
Senior had gone to prison and died penniless (and more than likely, any pennies
he had would have been returned to the persons from whom he stole), Nancy
Junior would have had no redress against him, and it would be hard to argue that
she had a claim upon Bill Junior’s human capital. But I propose to set this matter
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to one side for the moment and assume that a case can be made for saying that
descendants of victims of injustice are owed something. The question is: who are
the individual descendants of the victims of past injustice?
This question may be read in different ways. One way of reading it is by
taking it to mean “who should count as a descendant of a victim of past injus-
tice?” If this is the question, the answer in any given society could be a relatively
small or a worryingly large number. It would be a very large number if we
considered anyone a descendant of a victim if he or she could identify any
ancestor who had suffered injustice. If we confined our analysis to a single
society, like the United States, we would get a collection of individuals that
included at least the following: the descendants of African slaves, the descendants
of Native Americans, the descendants of people who were the victims of war, the
descendants of conscripts and neglected war veterans, the descendants of people
unjustly incarcerated (including but not only the Japanese imprisoned during
World War II), the descendants of anyone who was cheated, swindled, or taken
unfair advantage of by governments, businesses, unions, criminal organizations,
or individuals. Depending on how broadly injustice was defined, that number
could easily encompass the majority of the population. If, for example, we took
severe punishment for possessing and selling drugs to be unjust, then many
people have been the victims of injustice; but if we took severe punishment in this
instance to be warranted, many people are in fact the descendants of the victims
of justice. We could also stipulate how broadly or narrowly we wish to construe
injustice by determining a strong or weak minimum standard by which we deem
whether an injustice has been committed. If being verbally abused by a policeman
is sufficient for someone to claim victimhood, the number of victims could be
impossibly large. Finally, if we took the victims of injustice to include women
who had been treated unjustly in the workplace, in the home, or by laws limiting
their right to work or to receive equal pay, the descendants of the victims of past
injustice might include everyone.
The point here, of course, is not to suggest that no one could be distinguished
as a descendant of a victim of past injustice because everyone is a descendant. It
is, rather, to say that identifying the set of people to be recognized as the descen-
dants of victims is a complex and contentious matter. It requires determining not
only who to include but who to exclude from consideration.
Another way of reading the question is by taking it to mean “how do we tell
if someone is a descendant of a victim of past injustice?” In some cases, this may
be relatively straightforward: the child of a slave or former slave is clearly in this
category. But what of the children, and grandchildren, of mixed descent? Does a
person with one black grandparent or one black great-grandparent count as black
or white? Even if we assume that the world is divided conveniently into victims
and perpetrators or beneficiaries of injustice, it is not obvious how we should
categorize those with ancestors on both sides of the divide—leaving to one side
the issue of whether descent should be understood purely biologically or to
include relationship through adoption.
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A further complexity arises when we consider whether the category of
descendants of victims of past injustice should be extended to include people
beyond the borders of the political community. Many people around the world
are the descendants of refugees who fled persecution, often leaving behind both
the experience of violent treatment and their personal wealth or livelihoods.
Intermarriage over the generations has created many people who are the descen-
dants of people who have suffered great injustice. Sometimes it is difficult to
identify these people. On other occasions it is not: if we take the case of Liberia
for example, a country founded by the forcible repatriation of black Americans
to African soil, we might say that almost everyone there is the descendant of
victims of injustice, although many people there may have only one American
ancestor.
The general problem in distinguishing the descendants of victims of past
injustice is that it is too easy to reach the point at which a very large proportion of
the population can be identified as descendants. If that happens, the moral force of
the claims made by some people will be diminished to the extent that many others
in the society might simply respond that they too have injustice in their histories.
Is there a better way of separating out the descendants of injustice who have strong
claims from those who do not?
An obvious alternative is to identify not individuals but groups that are the
descendants of victims of past injustice. This might have the immediate advantage
of giving us an entity that is easier to isolate and distinguish from other potential
claimants because it has persisted over a greater length of time and because tracing
an ancestry will not be a problem. Moreover, the most serious injustices of the
past, which cry out for rectification, were committed against groups or people as
members of groups. The two issues that have to be settled, however, are which
groups to count, and whom to include within them. This may be difficult, and we
should consider why.
To begin with the matter of which groups to count, it may seem plain that
certain groups are almost self-evidently candidates. The descendants of African
slaves in modern America, and the indigenous peoples dispossessed of their lands
in many parts of the world come to mind. It would be impossible to deny that
slaves and dispossessed people were the victims of injustice many generations
ago, or that the injustice the people of these groups continued to suffer was
injustice in succeeding generations. The main point of contention is not whether
such groups are plausible candidates for restitution but whether excluding the
descendants of other victims of past injustice is warranted. The question is not just
“why these groups and not others?” but also “why not people who don’t fall into
notable groups, but are the descendants of victims of serious injustice all the
same?” One powerful reason for picking out particular groups but not others may
be that the injustice suffered by these groups have had a particularly significant
impact on the life of the society as a whole—perhaps so much so that it would
make a difference to the quality of life in that society if these particular grievances
were addressed. While this is an important reason, and one that may well justify
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attempting to offer restitution to the descendants of some groups, it is not, in the
end, a reason that invokes the importance of doing justice for its own sake. (I will
return to this point at the conclusion of this paper.)
The issue of who is to be included within a group being recognized as
descending from victims of past injustice raises different problems. Most of these
problems stem from the fact that groups are made up of individuals, and sub-
groups of individuals, with different histories, and often quite complex identities.
Morally speaking, those histories themselves can be quite mixed. Consider, for
example, the case of the Seminole Indians. The Seminoles were bands of Creek
Indians who separated from the tribe and settled in northern Florida in the
seventeenth century. They practiced slavery, not only of other Indians captured in
battle, but also of Africans whom they purchased or were given as gifts by the
British. By the nineteenth century, however, the black Seminole population had
grown and established a strong, independent community, which actually joined
with the Seminoles to resist the attempt of Americans to annex Florida. They
fought against General Andrew Jackson in the First Seminole War (1817–18), and
later in the Second Seminole War (1835–42), and gained a measure of indepen-
dence. But they were then forced to face the Creek Indians, who were intent on
enslaving them, and reintegrating the Seminole Indians into Creek society. Many
fled to Mexico to escape Creek slave-hunters, though a good number returned
after the Civil War to work as Indian Scouts. They claim that they were promised
their own land in Texas in return, but in the end the War Department denied that
they had land to offer, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs refused to give them land
on the grounds that they were not really Indians.
How should these groups be understood if the issue is the rectification of past
injustice? The Seminoles and Creeks were certainly victims of injustice, since
theirs is a history of dispossession; but they were also perpetrators of some serious
injustices against each other and against Africans, in collaboration with Ameri-
cans. The black Seminoles appear to have a less ambiguous history, but even they
returned to work as scouts in an American army intent on clearing the southwest
of Comanches and Apaches to make room for white settlements. Even they were
complicit in serious injustices.
The question is whether the complexity of history and identity should be
assumed away in order to focus on the larger story of injustice, in this case the
story of African slavery and the dispossession of indigenous peoples. If the detail
is obliterated in the moral accounting, however, it is not clear that what would be
guiding the decision to rectify past injustice are the injustices themselves but other
ethical considerations.
More generally, there is a problem in determining whom to include in groups
that might be candidates for restitution to the extent that individuals may be of
mixed descent, having ancestors who were both victims and perpetrators of
injustice. Others might be descended from a mix of immigrants and ancestors
who suffered injustice. This problem may be compounded by the fact that some
groups refuse to recognize some individuals or subgroups as members of their
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communities. At present, for example, the existence of black members of the
Seminole Indians is a contentious issue because the sums paid to the Seminoles in
compensation for dispossession would have to be further divided if Indians of
African descent were included.
None of this is to suggest that identifying the agents who are the descendants
of victims of past injustice is impossible. There may well be cases where the
identity of the groups in question, and their membership, can readily be settled.
My point is only that there are serious obstacles in the way of making a ready
determination in many cases.
Yet even if the identities of the descendants of victims of past injustice can be
settled, there remains the problem of establishing who should be held liable for
restitution. This problem is more serious because even if it is true that injustices
were committed in the past and the descendants of victims have suffered as a
consequence, this may not be sufficient reason to hold many—or indeed, any—
people today responsible for rectifying the situation.
A number of difficulties stand in the way of establishing responsibility for
past injustice. One set of difficulties stems from the problem of determining who
was responsible for the original injustices that might now generate claims on the
part of descendants of victims. If one takes the case of African slavery, the
perpetrators of injustice certainly include slave owners, slave traders, and those
who supported the institution of slavery, whether by backing governments who
upheld it or serving as officials who enforced the law protecting it. But this means
some responsibility for the original injustice must be borne by people from other
countries who captured and sold slaves. Equally, it is difficult to hold responsible
for the injustice of slavery those who had no part in it, or who disapproved of it,
or who worked to eliminate it.
It might be argued that all who benefited from slavery can be held responsible
to some degree, and one might conclude from this that no one in the United States
was free from the taint of this particular injustice.5 But those who benefited from
slavery included not only those whites who lived in the United States but others as
well. American assets, including slave enterprises, were held by people in Europe
who invested their money abroad; the products of slave labor were sold all around
the world; and even some Africans and American Indians took advantage of the
slave trade to enrich themselves. White Americans may bear the heaviest burden
of responsibility for slavery, as they might also for the dispossession of indigenous
peoples, but they do not bear it alone. It that is so, the case for holding their
descendants peculiarly responsible for these injustices of the past would be
weakened.
The argument for holding these descendants responsible is weakened further
by the fact that, with the passing of generations, many countries such as Australia
and the United States have admitted immigrants who have had no part in the
injustices of the past insofar as they have no ancestors who were even indirectly
implicated in wrongs committed in their new country. This view is rejected by
Bernard Boxill, who argues that even “white immigrants who arrived in the U.S.
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after the abolition of slavery” are liable to pay reparations to the descendants of
slaves.
They came to take advantage of opportunities, funded by assets to which the slaves had
titles, or to take natural assets including land to which the slaves also had titles. The fact that
they competed for these opportunities and worked hard misses the point. They have a right
to their own earnings, but it does not follow that they own the opportunities that enabled
them to make the earnings.6
The problem with this argument, however, is that if immigrants can become
inculpated in wrongdoing by taking advantage of opportunities that arise out of
injustice, it would seem that anyone who so profits can also be inculpated.
Investors who never set foot in the United States, but who have traded with a
society in which an unpaid debt is owed, would also be liable. There is no reason
why residence or membership of a society should make a difference. The number
of people who can be held liable could well be more numerous outside the United
States than within. But if this is the conclusion to which this principle leads, that
is reason to doubt the plausibility of the principle.
Finally, the argument for holding the descendants of the perpetrators or
beneficiaries of injustice liable for making restitution is weakened by intermar-
riage and the fact that people’s identities are complex mixtures of different
inheritances. If responsibility for rectifying past injustice is to be sheeted home to
anyone, it would have to be to a different kind of agent.
One possibility here is that we might hold liable not individual persons but
certain kinds of group agents. There are a number of candidates, including com-
panies, private organizations such as churches, and governments, from the local
to state and national. Such entities might be held responsible for restitution for
past injustice because, at least in some cases, they might be not so much the
descendants of perpetrators of injustice in the past as entities whose complicity in
past injustice is real because they are the same agents as those that originated in
the past. Coca-Cola today is the same entity as the Coca-Cola of fifty years ago,
and the Catholic Church of today is the same entity as the church of a millennium
ago. Companies and churches can be held accountable for the injustices of the
past if they themselves committed them. The same might hold for governments,
which do not change with each new administration but remain continuous for as
long as the polity remains stable and the personnel change without affecting the
regime.7
This solution might have some merit, but a couple of difficulties ought to be
recognized nonetheless. First, there are relatively few companies that have oper-
ated for long enough, and continue to exist, which might be found responsible and
so held liable for compensating the descendants of their own injustice. There have
been many companies in history that were guilty of committing serious injustices
in pursuit of profit: the British and Dutch East India Companies are obvious
examples. But the number of such corporations that can be identified today as
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having been responsible for wrongs in the past may be small, if only because
corporations are often taken over, or decline and disappear.
Second, if we consider churches to be possible candidates for being held
liable for past injustice, we need to ask whether and how far a charitable organi-
zation can be held responsible for wrongs committed by those under its authority,
and how this should be balanced against the contributions it has made to amelio-
rating the condition of the poor and the destitute.
In the light of these considerations, perhaps the only entities that can properly
be held responsible for rectifying past injustice are the political ones. In part, this
is because there may be an argument for holding governments responsible for the
wrongs committed in the societies they rule. But more generally, governments
could be charged with the task of remedying precisely those wrongs for which it
is difficult to identify the real culprits.
III
Governments can clearly be held responsible for rectifying past injustices
when they themselves have committed them. If governments can be sued or
required to compensate people for taking their property, then they can surely be
required to restore people who have been harmed by injustices the government
committed a long time ago.
But should governments, or more particularly, the state, be considered a kind
of moral agent that can be charged with the duty of acting as a kind of rectifier of
last resort of the injustices that societies have been unable to remedy? It is often
difficult to establish clear lines of responsibility for many of the wrongs we see in
society. This paper has focused on only one kind of difficulty: the problem of
identifying the agents involved in issues of historical injustice. But there are other
difficulties I have not touched upon.8 Yet it seems evident that some injustices of
the past have an enduring legacy, and it surely will not do to let them go unad-
dressed because clean lines of responsibility cannot readily be drawn. Perhaps it
is a part of the role of the state to address precisely these problems: to do justice
by considering the relations between different groups and communities that com-
prise it, and that have shaped the larger political society.
Tempting though this thought may be, it should be resisted. Particularly if the
state in question is a liberal democratic state, accountable to its citizens, it is, in the
end, obliged to do only what it can justify to those citizens. If there is no plausible
justification for holding one part of society responsible for compensating another
for injustices committed in the past, there is no warrant for calling upon the state
to take any particular action. Or at least, any action it takes in the name of
rectifying past injustice could only be seen as having a symbolic quality. In order
to repair, not the wrongs done to people in the past, but the fabric of a society that
has been torn by serious injustices in its history, it might move to compensate
the descendants of victims of past injustice. Its move here would, however, be
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primarily of symbolic importance. And it could not go too far without raising
among the citizenry the question of whether its actions are what justice really
demands.
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